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• Introduction of autonomous vehicles within next years / next decades 
• Privately owned vehicles 
• Autonomous car-sharing systems (ACS) 
and autonomous ride-sharing systems (ARS) 
 
• Different interests of different stakeholders 
 
• Uncertainty of the acceptance by the users 
 
• Sketch planning to narrow down the extent of possible effects 
 
Motivation 
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Methodology 
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• based on MiD data (60k persons , 190k trips) 
 
• generation of attributes of non-chosen mode alternatives (among them 
ACS/ARS) 
 
• multinomial logit mode choice model (probability 𝑝𝑖 for mode 𝑖)  
𝑝𝑖 =
𝑒𝑉𝑖
 𝑒
𝑉𝑗
𝑗
 for mode 𝑖 ∈ 𝑗 with 𝑗 = 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑘, 𝑏𝑖𝑘𝑒, 𝑐𝑎𝑟, 𝑝𝑡,
𝐴𝐶𝑆
𝐴𝑅𝑆
 with 𝑉𝑖 = 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽𝑔𝑐 ∗ 𝑔𝑐𝑖 
 
• no physical road network  no capacity restraint functions 
 
Simulation approach: Aspatial travel demand model 
For details see 
Trommer et al. (2016) 
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Autonomous Car Sharing (ACS) 
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Autonomous Car Sharing (ACS) 
 
© OpenStreetMap contributors 
ACS 
Shared Vehicles √ 
Shared Rides 
Detours  possible 
Empty rides 
possible 
√ 
Division of costs 
between users 
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Autonomous Ride Sharing (ARS): 
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Autonomous Ride Sharing (ARS): 
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Shared Rides √ 
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Empty rides 
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• Grid search for different user price-fleet density-combinations 
 
• Analysis of operator profit, mode shares, VKT, … 
 
Methodology: Grid search 
[1. Stau wie genannt nicht modelliert (nicht 
in GC_User enthalten, 
2. Environmental Costs nicht genannt] 
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• Grid search for different user price-fleet density-combinations 
 
• Analysis of operator profit, mode shares, VKT, … 
 
• Identification of two cases: 
1. ZP: Zero-profit monopoly  operator profit = 0 
• Breaking-even-point (comparable to an oligopoly-situation) 
• Min. user price (comparable to an oligopoly-situation) 
2. UM: Unregulated monopoly  max. profit 
• Max. Operator profit (𝛱𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 = 𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 − 𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟) 
 
• Constraint: Vehicle usage rate < 50% (operationally feasible) 
 
 
Methodology: Grid search 
[1. Stau wie genannt nicht modelliert (nicht 
in GC_User enthalten, 
2. Environmental Costs nicht genannt] 
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Methodology: Grid search 
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Methodology: Grid search 
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𝑅𝑣𝑢 =
(𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦 + 𝑇𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑)
24 h
 
With: 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦  … time for empty rides per day [h] 
 𝑇𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑  … time for loaded rides per day [h] 
Vehicle usage rate 
𝑅𝑣𝑢 
++ 
- - 
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Reference scenario 
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ACS: Results reference scenario 
 
• ZP: 0.33 €/user-km / 4.50 vehicles/1000 inhabitants 
• UM: 1.00 €/user-km / 1.55 vehicles/1000 inhabitants 
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ACS: Results reference scenario 
 
• ZP: 0.33 €/user-km / 4.50 vehicles/1000 inhabitants 
• UM: 1.00 €/user-km / 1.55 vehicles/1000 inhabitants 
ZP 
UM 
User price [EUR/km] 
F
le
e
t 
d
e
n
s
it
y
 
[v
e
h
ic
le
s
/1
0
0
0
 i
n
h
.]
 
O
p
e
ra
to
r 
p
ro
fi
t 
[M
io
. 
€
/d
a
y
] 
Z  
> ITEA 2017 > L. Kröger  •  Autonomous car- and ride-sharing systems > 22 June 2017   
Sensitivity analyses for ACS 
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• Mode choice model takes into account for valuation of mode alternatives: 
• Travel time and access & egress times (based on fleet density) 
• Travel costs (based on user price) 
• Mode specific constant (alternative specific constant – ASC) 
 
Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Alternative specific constant 
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• Mode choice model takes into account for valuation of mode alternatives: 
• Travel time and access & egress times (based on fleet density) 
• Travel costs (based on user price) 
• Mode specific constant (alternative specific constant – ASC) 
 
Variation of ASC (in relation to car- and pt-ASC) 
• Higher ASC:  𝐴𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑆 = 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑝𝑡 + 0.75 ∗ (𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑐𝑎𝑟 − 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑝𝑡) 
• Reference scenario: 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑆 = 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑝𝑡 + 0.50 ∗ (𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑐𝑎𝑟 − 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑝𝑡) 
• Lower ASC:  𝐴𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑆 = 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑝𝑡 + 0.25 ∗ (𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑐𝑎𝑟 − 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑝𝑡) 
Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
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Which effects can be observed? 
• Operator profit 
• ZP and UM move 
• Mode shares 
• Total VKT on road 
Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Alternative specific constant 
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Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Alternative specific constant (higher value) 
 
• ZP:  0.32 €/user-km /  6.00 vehicles/1000 inhabitants 
• UM:  1.05 €/user-km /  1.75 vehicles/1000 inhabitants 
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Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Alternative specific constant (higher value) 
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Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Alternative specific constant (higher value) 
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Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Alternative specific constant (higher value) 
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Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Alternative specific constant (lower value) 
 
• ZP:  0.34 €/user-km /  3.50 vehicles/1000 inhabitants 
• UM:  0.95 €/user-km /  1.25 vehicles/1000 inhabitants 
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Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Alternative specific constant (lower value) 
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Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Alternative specific constant (lower value) 
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Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Alternative specific constant (lower value) 
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Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Alternative specific constant 
Scenario 
User price 
[€/km] 
Fleet density [veh / 
1000 inh.] 
Operator profit 
Π p.d. [Mio. €] 
ACS 
mode share 
Change of VKT  
(relative to no-ACS case) 
Higher ASC 0.32 6.00 ~0 14.7 % + 4.8 % 
Reference scenario 0.33 4.50 ~0 10.6 % + 3.7 % 
Lower ASC 0.34 3.50 ~0 7.7 % + 3.0 % 
Scenario 
User price 
[€/km] 
Fleet density [veh / 
1000 inh.] 
Operator profit 
Π p.d. [Mio. €] 
ACS 
mode share 
Change of VKT  
(relative to no-ACS case) 
Higher ASC 1.05 1.75 20.3 7.6 % + 1.9 % 
Reference scenario 1.00 1.55 13.0 5.5 % + 1.5 % 
Lower ASC 0.95 1.25 8.5 4.1 % + 1.2 % 
2. Unregulated monopoly  max. operator profit 
1. Zero-profit monopoly  operator profit = 0 
• operator costs and empty ride shares influence lowest profitable user price 
(~0.30 €/km) 
• Unregulated mononpoly user price is three times larger than in the zero-profit case 
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• Sensitivity analysis of the influence of different cost structures of the operator 
costs 
• Comparison of the cost structures used in the scenario with that one described 
by Bösch et al. (2017) 
Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Cost Structure 
 
[Diese Studie hat einen Cost-Calculator 
herausgegeben, der zugänglich ist. 
Autoren regen Diskussion an] 
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• Sensitivity analysis of the influence of different cost structures of the operator 
costs 
• Comparison of the cost structures used in the scenario with that one described 
by Bösch et al. (2017) 
Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Cost Structure 
 
DLR (Trommer et al. 2016) 
ETHZ (Bösch et al. 2017) 
(1 EUR = 1.07 CHF) 
Depreciation & Interest [€/veh-km] 0.12 0.092 
HR, Vehicle Operations etc. [€/veh-km] 0.035 0.12 
Cleaning, Maintenance, 
Insurance, Vehicle Tax, Parking [€/veh-km] 
0.05 0.155 
Fuel/Electricity [€/veh-km] 0.075 0.066 
Profit Margin & VAT [€/veh-km] 0.00 0.044 
Total Cost [€/veh-km] 0.28 0.48 
[Diese Studie hat einen Cost-Calculator 
herausgegeben, der zugänglich ist. 
Autoren regen Diskussion an] 
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ETHZ (Bösch et al. 2017) 
(1 EUR = 1.07 CHF) 
Depreciation & Interest [€/veh-km] 0.12 0.092 
HR, Vehicle Operations etc. [€/veh-km] 0.035 0.12 
Cleaning, Maintenance, 
Insurance, Vehicle Tax, Parking [€/veh-km] 
0.05 0.155 
Fuel/Electricity [€/veh-km] 0.075 0.066 
Profit Margin & VAT [€/veh-km] 0.00 0.044 
Total Cost [€/veh-km] 0.28 0.48 
[Diese Studie hat einen Cost-Calculator 
herausgegeben, der zugänglich ist. 
Autoren regen Diskussion an] 
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Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Cost Structure (DLR) 
 
• ZP:  0.33 €/user-km / 4.50 vehicles/1000 inhabitants 
• UM:  1.00 €/user-km / 1.55 vehicles/1000 inhabitants 
• Low density areas: break-even user price amounts to  ~0.40 €/km 
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Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Cost Structure (ETHZ) 
 
• ZP:  0.64 €/user-km / 2.25 vehicles/1000 inhabitants 
• UM:  2.00 €/user-km / 1.00 vehicles/1000 inhabitants 
• Low density areas: break-even user price amounts to ~1.50 €/km + 
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Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Cost Structure (ETHZ) 
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Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
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Sensitivity analyses for ACS: 
Cost Structure 
Scenario 
User price 
[€/km] 
Fleet density [veh 
/ 1000 inh.] 
Operator profit 
Π p.d. [Mio. €] 
ACS 
mode share 
Change of VKT  
(relative to no-ACS case) 
DLR cost 
scenario 
0.33 4.50 ~0 10.6 % + 3.7 % 
ETH cost 
scenario 
0.64 2.25 ~0 7.3 % + 2.0 % 
Scenario 
User price 
[€/km] 
Fleet density [veh 
/ 1000 inh.] 
Operator profit 
Π p.d. [Mio. €] 
ACS 
mode share 
Change of VKT  
(relative to no-ACS case) 
DLR cost 
scenario 
1.00 1.55 13.0 5.4 % + 1.5 % 
ETH cost 
scenario 
2.00 1.00 6.8 3.4 % + 0.9 % 
2. Unregulated Monopoly  max. operator profit 
1. Zero-Profit Monopoly  operator profit = 0 
• Average trip length decreases when increasing the user price 
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Comparison of ACS and ARS 
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• User acceptance may be higher for ACS mode 
• User prices may be lower for ARS mode 
• Waiting times may be higher for ARS mode 
• Travel time may be higher for ARS mode (detour factors) 
 
What are the user price/fleet size combinations in 
(1) Zero-profit monopoly and 
(2) Unregulated monopoly ? 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of ACS and ARS 
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Zero profit over different area types 
• Spatial differences of user prices are higher for ARS than for ACS 
• Reason: high potential of pooling in urban regions at very low user prices 
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Zero profit vs unregulated monopoly 
Scenario 
User price 
[€/km] 
Fleet density [veh / 
1000 inh.] 
Operator profit 
Π [Mio. €] 
ACS/ARS 
mode share 
Change of VKT  
(relative to no-ACS case) 
ACS Scenario 0.30 – 0.35 3.0 – 5.0 ~0 8.2 – 12.5 % + 3.0 to +5.7 %  
ARS Scenario 0.12 – 0.38 2.5 – 3.5 ~0 4.4 – 11.1 % - 1.5 to 2.7 % 
2. Unregulated Monopoly  max. operator profit 
1. Zero-profit monopoly  operator profit = 0 
Scenario 
User price 
[€/km] 
Fleet density [veh / 
1000 inh.] 
Operator profit 
Π [Mio. €] 
ACS/ARS 
mode share 
Change of VKT  
(relative to no-ACS case) 
ACS Scenario 0.95 – 1.05 1.4 – 1.6 13.2 4.2 – 6.2 % + 1.2 to + 1.6 %  
ARS Scenario 0.45 – 0.80 1.3 – 1.5 6.2 2.5 – 6.0 % +  1.1 to + 1.8  %  
• Pooling works to a lesser degree in the unregulated monopoly 
• Local profit maximum for very-densely populated urban ARS schemes 
at 0.25 € / user-km 
• VKT reduction is observed only for ARS in urban regions (ZP) 
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Conclusion and Outlook 
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• Profit regions for ACS operations are highly dependent on user acceptance (utility 
function) and operator cost function: 
• Lower bound to break even (Germany): 0.33 – 0.64 €/km 
• Lower bound to break even (low density areas only): 0.40 – 1.50 €/km (!) 
 
• Price to break even approximately 3 times lower than in unregulated monopoly 
 
• Spatial differences of user prices are higher for ARS than for ACS  ARS user prices in 
urban agglomerations can go down to a level comparable to conventional public 
transport prices 
 
• VKT reduction is observed only for ARS in urban regions 
 
Outlook 
• Detailed analysis of modal shifts 
• Analysis of social welfare 
• Differentiation of price schemes 
 
 
Conclusion and Outlook 
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Thank you for your attention! 
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Autonomous car- and ride-sharing systems: 
A simulation-based evaluation 
of various supply options for different regions 
Lars Kröger 
in collaboration with Benjamin Kickhöfer 
German Aerospace Center (DLR) – Institute of Transport Research, Berlin 
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Backup 
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Model scheme: Aspatial Travel demand model 
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• Operator profit as difference between operator revenues and operator costs 
Π𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 = 𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 − 𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 
With: 𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 … Operator profit [€] 
 𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 … Operator revenue [€] 
 𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 … Operator costs [€] 
 
• Welfare as difference of operator profit and generalised user costs 
𝑊 = Π𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 − 𝐺𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 
With: 𝑊 … Welfare (as defined here, ignoring e.g. external costs) [€]
 𝐺𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 … generalised user costs [€] 
 
Methodology 
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• Operator revenue as product of user price per km and sum of vehicle-km in use 
𝑅𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 = 𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟.𝑘𝑚 ∗ 𝑘𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 
With: 𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟.𝑘𝑚  … price per user km [€/km] 
 𝑘𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟  … vehicle-km (loaded) [km] 
 
• Operator costs as sum of fixed operator costs per vehicle and product of 
variable operator costs per km and sum of vehicle-km (empty and loaded) 
𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 = 𝑝𝑓𝑖𝑥.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟.𝑣𝑒ℎ ∗ 𝑣𝑒ℎ + 𝑝𝑣𝑎𝑟.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟.𝑘𝑚 ∗ (𝑘𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦 + 𝑘𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟) 
With: 𝑝𝑓𝑖𝑥.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟.𝑣𝑒ℎ … fix operator costs per vehicle [€/vehicle per year] 
 𝑝𝑣𝑎𝑟.𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟.𝑘𝑚 … variable operator costs per vehicle-km [€/km] 
 𝑣𝑒ℎ  … number of vehicles 
 𝑘𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑦  … vehicle-km (empty) [km] 
 
 
Methodology 
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Spatial classification 
BIK BIK-category Population size Core region 
1 Rural < 2 k - 
2 Rural 2 - 5 k - 
3 Rural 5 - 20 k - 
4 Rural 20 - 50 k - 
5 Suburban 50 - 100 k - 
6 Urban 50 - 100 k Core region 
7 Suburban 100 - 500 k - 
8 Urban 100 - 500 k Core region 
9 Suburban >= 500 k - 
10 urban >= 500 k Core region 
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Parameter values 
trip purpose car availability mode intercept beta_gc 
1 0 walk 0 -0.670665 
1 0 cycle -1.0872081 -0.670665 
1 0 car -4.3769592 -0.670665 
1 0 pt 0.387225 -0.670665 
1 0 ACS 0.4047568 -0.670665 
1 1 walk 0 -0.5458953 
1 1 cycle -0.8393514 -0.5458953 
1 1 car -0.2790663 -0.5458953 
1 1 pt -0.3491937 -0.5458953 
1 1 ACS -0.31413 -0.5458953 
1 2 walk 0 -0.5458953 
1 2 cycle -0.8393514 -0.5458953 
1 2 car 1.0584506 -0.5458953 
1 2 pt -0.3491937 -0.5458953 
1 2 ACS -0.31413 -0.5458953 
2 0 walk 0 -0.2753231 
2 0 cycle -1.2532791 -0.2753231 
2 0 car -3.3000337 -0.2753231 
2 0 pt -1.3390296 -0.2753231 
2 0 ACS -0.8218296 -0.2753231 
2 1 walk 0 -0.3396498 
2 1 cycle -1.6771383 -0.3396498 
2 1 car -0.4223544 -0.3396498 
2 1 pt -2.4911545 -0.3396498 
2 1 ACS -1.4567544 -0.3396498 
2 2 walk 0 -0.3396498 
2 2 cycle -1.6771383 -0.3396498 
2 2 car 0.1148534 -0.3396498 
2 2 pt -2.4911545 -0.3396498 
2 2 ACS -1.4567544 -0.3396498 
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• Comparing different user prices (optimal fleet density is assumed  50% 
vehicle usage rate as defined here) 
Social Optimum (Schematic View)  
GC 
Π𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 
UM 
ZP 
SO 
p𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 
p𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 
ZP 
SO UM 
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